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THE Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Melbourne returns
in this book to a theme familiar to Australians acquainted with his other
works. This theme is epitomized by section XIII of the present volume:
"American experience and doctrines of private international law
have a very real importance for Australia in the interstate field. There
is the clearest evidence of direct copying of the American full faith and
credit provisions, although the two sets of provisions are not identical.
Yet very often Australian courts have followed English authority in in-
terstate private international law cases, sometimes ignoring what may be
thought to be obvious questions of full faith and credit. Sometimes, as in
the law of domicile, English rules have been followed in interstate cases,
where it might be thought that the American solutions and doctrines were
more appropriate .... For the future, it will be interesting to see whether
the full faith and credit clause continues to be the 'orphan clause' of the
Australian Constitution and, if not, how far American experience will
guide its interpretation. So, too, it will be interesting to see whether Aus-
tralian courts will pay increased attention to American authorities in seek-
ing solutions to interstate questions of private international law."'
As a natural implication of this approach, the weight of material in this
work involves problems arising among Australian states, with comparative
references to American authorities functioning to provide a reservoir of ideas,
many of which Cowen recommends for adoption in Australia. He is inclined
to disagree with the Victorian case of Harris v. Harris,2 which ruled that the
faith and credit due to an interstate judgment requires it to be recognized in
all other forums if it is final and conclusive in the state where it was pro-
nounced. 3 He would evidently prefer the American rule that the obligation to
accord full faith and credit to judgments from other states does not preclude
jurisdictional inquiry, at least if the proceedings were ex parte.4 Likewise, be-
lieving that in interstate torts cases Australian courts have incorrectly im-
posed a requirement of actionability by the law of the forum as well as by the
law of the place of commission, he adopts the American view that actionability
under the law of the place of commission is sufficient.5 Again, he recommends
that Australia reject, both in the interstate and international spheres, the Eng-
lish revival of domicile of origin doctrine, and adopt the American theory that
an existing domicile, whether of choice or origin, persists until a new domicile
of choice is acquired.6 And he feels that Australia should follow the United
States in recognizing a separate domicile for married women.7
1. P. 84.
2. [1947] Vict. L.R. 44 (Austr. 1946).
3. P. 24.
4. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948) ; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Wil-






Perhaps this extended discussion of Australian interstate problems will not
greatly interest the American practitioner. The remainder of the book, how-
ever, is oriented in his direction, for it consists of brief summaries of those
doctrines of Australian private international law and related subjects which
might have to be considered by an American lawyer dealing with cases having
Australian contacts. The author obviously has not found space to include a
similar survey of American doctrines for use by the Australian practitioner,
though some appear incidentally.
At first sight, Professor Cowen's format seems odd, for half of this short
monograph appears to be directed at the Australian reader, who is advised to
profit by the American experience, and the other half at the American reader,
who needs to know something of what Australian courts do. As already men-
tioned, however, Professor Cowen has dealt at some length in his Australian
publications with the central problems discussed in the first part of this book.8
And American experience with these problems is so economically treated
throughout the present work that one may safely infer that the part devoted
to internal Australian problems, as well as the part which follows, has been
consciously addressed to an American audience presumably already familiar
with American law. In this aspect, then, the entire book constitutes a report
on Australian developments to readers whose theoretical as well as profes-
sional interest in them has been variously evidenced.
The report is not encouraging from this standpoint. Cowen's objective is
that Australian courts become increasingly aware that international and inter-
state problems should not be solved in the same way ;9 yet there has been
negligible development in this direction since he last surveyed the field in
1952.10 An obiter remark in the 1954 case of Miller v. Teale "- suggests that
the full faith and credit clause of the Australian Constitution might have to be
considered in determining the validity in one Australian state of a divorce
decree issued in another. 12 Professor Cowen is unable to point to any further
cases during this period in which the clause has been discussed. Harris v.
Harris remains practically unannotated.
Professor Cowen possibly overemphasizes the extent to which the Australian
courts are responding to local conditions in diverging from doctrines of Eng-
lish private international law. The examples he gives in this connection are
confined to obiter remarks paralleling criticisms by orthodox English text
writers of English decisions long regarded as unsatisfactory in that country.
He says, for instance, that Miller v. Teale implies clearly enough that the
anomalous rule of Sottomayor v. DeBarros 13 and Ogden v. Ogden 14 will not
S. Cowen, Full Faith and Credit--The Australian Experience, 6 REs JUDICATAE 27
(1952).
9. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
10. Cowen, supra note 8.
11. [1954] Argus L.R. 1109 (Austr.).
12. Id. at 1113.
13. 5 P.D. 94 (1879).
14. [1908] P. 46 (C.A. 1907).
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be followed in Australia, and that Miller illustrates again the High Court's
willingness to depart on occasion from English authority.15 Ogden v. Ogden
has already been overruled in England,' 6 although on a point separate from
the principle which was discussed in Miller v. Teale; and both Cheshire 17 and
Dicey,18 the standard English texts, condemn the principle in question. All
that was said in Miller v. Teale was that the principle was "dubious,"' 1 under
these circumstances surely not a convincing expression of Australian inde-
pendence. Cowen takes Machado v. Fontes 20 as another example of English
authority on which there has been Australian dissent.21 But once again the
criticism, made obiter in two or three judgments, has been in line with English
text writing.22 One cannot support inferences about the relation between the
judicial doctrines of the two countries by referring to Australian criticisms of
English authority which might equally well come, and in fact have come, from
judges sitting in England.23 A sociological comparison of Australian and
English decisions, taking account of differing national conditions, is a project
much to be admired; but one cannot create the materials for such an exami-
nation by attributing a special local significance to passages in Australian judg-
ments of the sort to which Professor -Cowen here refers.
In the field of full faith and credit, with which Professor Cowen is primarily
concerned, studies of American material have had a marked impact on the
Australian academic fraternity as distinguished from the profession generally.
Professor Cowen states that the literature in Australia on private international
law is meager.24 This is undoubtedly true, and the present work will constitute
a welcome addition to it. But, comparatively, problems of full faith and cred-
it have received much attention, particularly since Professor Cowen's 1952
article.25 When Harris was decided in 1947, it received a somewhat uncritical
acceptance. I myself welcomed its implications for interstate judgments, 26
and Professor Cowen at first took the same view.2 7 We were moreover en-
couraged in whatever complacency we felt by favorable American reaction.
In 1949 Brunson MacChesney told the Committee on Comparative Interna-
15. P. 51.
16. De Reneville v. De Reneville, [1948] P. 100 (C.A. 1947).
17. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (5th ed. 1957).
18. DIcEY, THE CONFLICr OF LAws 761, 785-86 (6th ed. 1949).
19. [1954] Argus L.R. at 1113.
20. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.).
2L Pp. 61-62.
22. See the summary of criticisms in CHEsHnIE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 274-76;
Drczy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 802 n.22.
23. See the reference in Koop v. Bebb, 84 Commw. L.R. 629, 643 (Austr. 1951), to
Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Parent, [1917] A.C. 195, 205 (P.C.).
24. P. 10.
25. Cowen, supra note 8.
26. Morison, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Juidgments Within the Commonwealth
of Alstralia, 21 AusmR. L.J. 298 (1947).
27. Cowen, The Recognition of Foreign Judgments Under a Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 2 INT'L L.Q. 21, 21-25, 621-34 (1948).
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tional Law that the Australian development had "resulted in a more uniform
and predictable system, and one that offers promise of achieving the under-
lying purposes of a full faith and credit clause." 28 But in 1951 Dean Griswold
of Harvard visited Australia and engaged in a counteroffensive. He defended
American policy regarding interstate recognition of divorce decrees and sug-
gested reasons why the decision in Harris v. Harris should be reconciled with
it.20 Professor Cowen, unable to accept the suggested reconciliation, then de-
parted from his earlier view and urged that Harris was wrong and that the
American position-that the full faith and credit clause does not preclude
jurisdictional inquiry-was correct. He presented an extensive survey embody-
ing these conclusions at the annual conference of the Australian Universities
Law Schools Association in 1952.30
Reaction was varied and somewhat startling. J. G. Fleming of Canberra,
who had previously disapproved Harris v. Harris, announced to the Confer-
ence that he proposed to exercise the same privilege taken by Professor Cowen
and now wished to approve automatic recognition by all Australian states of
a divorce conclusive in the state where given. R. P. Roulston of Tasmania,
who had gone on record as favoring a limitation of Harris to situations in
which the original decree was based on an explicit finding of domicile,3 1 now
announced his intention to accept the broad proposition that divorces be recog-
nized whenever conclusive in tlie state where given.3 2 Mr. Sykes of Queens-
land subsequently expressed a preference for Mr. Roulston's original position,
arguing that full faith and credit requires effect to be given to judgments and
laws of other states only if common law rules of private international law so
require; however, he would not incorporate within the clause those common
law qualifications on recognition based on the recognizing forum's public policy
or on re-examination of jurisdictional facts.33
Sykes's position, while harmonizing with the American notion that legis-
lative and other jurisdictional qualifications are to be given full faith and cred-
it, ignores Professor Cowen's suggestion as to what constitutes the chief lesson
of American experience. According to Cowen, this experience shows that in-
ternational conflicts rules are not necessarily suitable for dealing with problems
arising among the states of a federation, and that courts therefore should
28. MacChesney, Full Faith and Credit-A Comparative Study, 44 IL. L. REv. 298,
310 (1949).
29. Griswold, Divorce .urisdiction} and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Coln-
parative Study, 25 Ausm. L.J. 248, 261-62 (1951), also published in 65 HARv. L. Rzv.
193, 221 (1951).
30. Cowen, supra note 8.
31. Roulston, Some Aspects of the Plea Lis Alibi Pendens, 1 U. WESTE Ausm.
ANN. L. REV. 289, 292 (1949).
32. He took the earliest opportunity to elaborate this thesis in an extensive review
of the subject of divorce decrees. Roulston, Inter-state and International Divorce Recog-
nitida, The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Cominon Law, 26 Ausm. L.J. 400,
405-06 (1952).
33. Sykes, Full Faith and Credit--Further Reflections, 6 REs JUDIcATAE 353 (1954).
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develop jurisdictional limitations implied in the full faith and credit clause free
from any suggestion that they must coincide with international conflicts rules.
On this question, Professor Cowen's approach appears to be preferable. Under
conditions presently obtaining in Australia, however, the broad principle stated
in Harris v. Harris probably should be accepted and both Mr. Sykes's and
Professor Cowen's views rejected. There is no real likelihood that interstate
recognition of judgments conclusive in the state where given would lead to
attempts by any state to legislate for the whole of Australia. The usual prac-
tice of state legislatures is to avoid questions of private international law by
the simple expedient of neglecting to give state statutes any territorial dimen-
sion at all. The state courts are therefore left to determine the scope of local
laws; and these bodies have tended to give such a narrow territorial applica-
tion to state statutes as to have excited the concern of the High Court of
Australia.34
The Roulston and Sykes articles have escaped notice in the documentation
of Professor Cowen's work. These commentaries together with those cited by
Cowen indicate a not inconsiderable Australian academic interest in the sub-
ject of full faith and credit. But the lack of professional exploitation of the
provision stands in such contrast to the academic interest as to give to Pro-
fessor Cowen's progress account to Americans somewhat the aspect of a report
from an outlying monastery to the central institutions of the order.35
W. L. MORISONt
34. See Koop v. Bebb, 84 Commw. L.R. 629 (Austr. 1951).
35. A review of the present work by Mr. Alan W. Mewett appears in 36 CAN. B. REv.
118 (1958). One of the specific charges made by Mr. Mewett in a generally critical re-
view is that Professor Cowen "elevates the strong dicta in Travers v. Holley [ [1953] P.
246] as to reciprocal recognition of divorce decrees by courts not of the domicile to the
status of ratio decidendi." 36 CAN. B. REv. at 119. The suggestion that the remarks in that
case were obiter was originally made by Davies, J., in his opinion in Dunne v. Saban, [1955]
P. 178, 186 (1954), an opinion which his lordship prefaced with the remark that he would
have preferred to reserve judgment had he not been leaving on circuit the following day. Id.
at 183. Davies, J.'s proposition has been dismissed in a sentence by one commentator as
based on a misunderstanding of the facts in Travers v. Holley. Kennedy, Recognition of
Foreign Divorces: The Effect of Travers v. Holley, 4 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 389, 392 (1955).
The seeming rashness of an undefended repetition of Davies, J.'s proposition at this stage
by Mr. Mewett may induce the reader to accept his more sweeping criticisms of Professor
Cowen's work with some caution.
"Associate Professor of Common Law, University of Sydney; Senior Fellow and Visit-
ing Lecturer, Yale Law School, 1957-58.
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